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I.    INTRODUCTION 
In a reoccurring fashion,1 the nondelegation doctrine was left in 
constitutional exile yet again as a fractured Supreme Court ruled against a 
nondelegation challenge in Gundy v. United States.2  The nondelegation 
doctrine is a constitutional principle that prohibits Congress from 
conferring its legislative power to another branch of government.3  Any 
elementary school student can tell you that the legislature “makes the law,” 
the executive “enforces the law,” and the judiciary “interprets the law.”4  
Nevertheless, in modern times, Congress has delegated much of its authority 
to write rules and regulations, with the effect of law, to administrative 
agencies within the Executive Branch.5  The Court has only used the 
 
1. For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s ruling against challenges to an unconstitutional 
delegation of power, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Loving v. United States, 
517 U.S. 748 (1996); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361 (1989) (holding there was no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). 
2. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
3. Id. at 2121. 
4. Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Justice in Support of Reversal at 1, Gundy v. United States, 
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2684384 [hereinafter Brief for the Institute for Justice]. 
5. See Aditya Bamzai, Comment, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the 
Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164 (2019) [hereinafter Bamzai, Delegation 
and Interpretive Discretion] (discussing the Congressional authority delegated to administrative agencies).  
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nondelegation doctrine twice, both in 1935, to strike down an act of 
Congress as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority6—leading 
to an eighty-five-year hiatus for the doctrine.  Its absence has left many to 
declare the doctrine as dead-letter law.7  Though the nondelegation doctrine 
remains in exile, perhaps the Gundy concurrence and dissent has at least 
cracked open the door and invited future nondelegation challenges.8  The 
issue certainly drew strong support calling for a revival of the doctrine,9 
likely bolstered by support when the decision came down.  Gundy has caused 
many to wonder what the future may hold for the nondelegation doctrine.10  
There is no doubt this case will help shape the future of administrative law 
in the United States.  
Part I of this paper identifies the constitutional basis for the 
nondelegation doctrine.  It discusses constitutional rationales and 
influences, which helped the founders shape America’s constitutional order.  
The history of the nondelegation doctrine is traced from its origin to the 
intelligible principle’s current standard while evaluating its treatment by the 
 
6. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (holding the 
provision at issue was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and thus violated the 
nondelegation doctrine); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (striking down the 
provision at issue because it went beyond the “limits of delegation”).  
7. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV. 1035, 
1038 (2007) [hereinafter Alexander & Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot]; Andrew Coan & Nicholas 
Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 780 (2016); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001); Alexander Volokh, The New Private Regulation 
Skepticism Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 974 
(2014) (all declaring the nondelegation doctrine is essentially nonexistent).  
8. John Yoo & James C. Phillips, With Kavanaugh, the Court Should Tame the Administrative State, 
NAT’L REV. (Oct. 25, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/10/supreme-court-
brett-kavanaugh-administrative-state/ [https://perma.cc/T46A-PGF9] (discussing how the Court’s 
decision in Gundy is likely to generate many nondelegation cases as parties challenge delegations that 
seem similarly broad or broader than the challenged provision in Gundy); Evan Zoldan, Gundy v. 
United States: A Peek Into the Future of Government Regulation, HILL (June 21, 2019, 12:24 PM), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/449687-gundy-v-united-states-a-peek-into-the-future-of-gover 
nment-regulation [https://perma.cc/BXW9-GS4K].  
9. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioner at 5–9, 
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2684381; Brief of William D. 
Araiza et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17–6086), 
2018 WL 2733950; Brief for the Cato Institute and Cause of Action Institute as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at 2–5, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2412171; Brief  Institute for 
Justice, supra note 4, at 27–29, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2684384; Brief for the 
Pacific Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20–22, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 
(No. 17–6086), 2018 WL 2684377 [hereinafter Brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation]. 
10. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2116 (upholding the provision of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA or the Act) because it did not violate the nondelegation doctrine). 
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courts.  Part II discusses the recent case of Gundy v. United States and the 
impassioned dissent by Justice Gorsuch, which may help shape the future 
of administrative law.  The appointment of federal judges by 
President Trump has changed the federal judicial landscape, thereby 
increasing the possibility of a revived nondelegation doctrine.  Part III seeks 
to identify the tension, if any, between the nondelegation doctrine and 
rulemaking procedures placed on federal agencies in part by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  Lastly, Part IV will identify how a 
revived nondelegation doctrine may diminish the importance of the APA.  
Before taking an in-depth look into the Gundy opinion and possible post-
Gundy effects by the federal judiciary, it is vital to first understand the 
nondelegation doctrine’s historical roots and foundation.  
A. Constitutional Principles and the Nondelegation Doctrine 
“The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of 
powers that underlies our tripartite system of government.”11  Article I of 
the Constitution established that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”12  Articles II and III 
share similar clauses vesting executive power in a President of the United 
States13 and judicial power in one Supreme Court and inferior courts.14  
The United States is a government of enumerated powers, and each branch 
of government can only exercise the powers granted to it;15 “[t]hus the 
Constitution recognizes distinct grants of governmental power that can be 
categorized as either legislative, executive, or judicial . . . .16  Though there 
is no explicit provision in the Constitution enumerating a commitment to 
the separation of powers, such a commitment is evident through 
constitutional structure, text, and provisions.17 
A government modeled on the separation of powers is not an American 
invention, as it has long served as a defense against tyranny before America’s 
 
11. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).  
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
13. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
14. Id. art. III, § 1. 
15. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). 
16. Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 379, 388 (2017) [hereinafter Whittington & Iuliano, Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine]. 
17. See id. at 388–89 (suggesting Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution implicitly acknowledge 
the separation of powers principle). 
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founding.18  John Locke, who strongly influenced the framers of the 
Constitution, once declared: 
The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it 
being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it 
over to others. . . .  And when the people have said, We will submit to rules, 
and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, [nobody] else 
can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by 
any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and 
authorized to make laws for them.19 
This notion is embodied in the Constitution as the governed chose to vest 
Congress with the authority to make all legislative decisions.20 
The framers constructed a government of separate powers because they 
recognized the culmination of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in 
the same hands is the “very definition of tyranny.”21  This government 
structure was insisted upon to ensure the people’s liberty would not be 
unduly restricted as separation of powers is viewed as an essential element 
of a free government.22  The co-equal branches of government are to serve 
as a check on each other.23  The Constitution’s design seeks to hold the 
government accountable to the People and secure the blessings of liberty.24  
Nondelegation is a principal ratified by “We the People” in an effort “to 
form a more perfect Union.”25  It serves as the very foundation of 
government from which the United States grew and prospered.  When 
separate powers begin to co-mingle, protections breakdown and liberty is 
threatened.26  The controversial issue is not whether the nondelegation 
 
18. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996); see generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna 
Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 
(2003) [hereinafter Alexander & Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly 
Exaggerated] (discussing how the nondelegation doctrine dates back three centuries). 
19. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 74–75 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690) (emphasis added). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 308 (James Madison) (The Project Gutenburg ed., 2013).  
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 316–18 (James Madison) (The Project Gutenburg ed., 2013). 
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 333−34 (James Madison) (The Project Gutenburg ed., 2013). 
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 21, at 308. 
25. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
26. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 21, at 314 (James Madison) (equating tyranny to 
“an accumulation of all powers . . . , in the same hands”). 
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doctrine should exist.27  It is more than likely most people agree that 
separation of powers to prevent tyranny and suppression of liberty is a good 
thing.  Rather, the issue is the test the Supreme Court should use to 
determine whether a delegation is a constitutionally permissible grant of 
power from the legislative branch.28   
II.    NONDELEGATION IN THE COURTS 
A. Pre-Intelligible Principle 
The Court first addressed a nondelegation challenge during the Jefferson 
administration, but the Court did not elaborate greatly on the issue.29  A 
short time later, the Court recognized the first nondelegation principle in 
Wayman v. Southard,30 from which the doctrine would grow.  The Wayman 
Court considered a challenge to a delegation by Congress to the federal 
judiciary, which granted rulemaking power to the courts for determining 
judicial procedure.31  The Court held the statute did not impermissibly grant 
the judiciary legislative power as Congress provided the controlling general 
policy that courts should follow when establishing procedural rules.32  In 
the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that “the maker of the law 
may commit something to the discretion of the other departments” while 
noting that it is a “delicate and difficult inquiry” to differentiate between 
permissible and impermissible delegations of power.33   
Though the Court only provided vague boundaries for permissible 
delegation, it recognized that the legislature may enact a statute with general 
provisions, and those acting pursuant to the general provisions may “fill up 
 
27. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2119 (2019) (explaining the delegation of power 
provision found in the Constitution). 
28. Id. 
29. The challenge against the Non-Intercourse Act was designed to prevent the U.S. from taking 
sides between Britain and France.  The Act allowed the president to lift the embargo against either 
country if either recognized the U.S.’s neutral commerce rights.  An owner of a cargo ship challenged 
the Act as an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the executive.  The Court did not 
specifically address the delegation challenge, but the opinion suggests the president was simply a fact-
finder.  See Cargo of the Brig. Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 382–85 (1813) (declining 
to address whether the act created potential problems of excessive delegation).  
30. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1820). 
31. See id. at 19 (describing how the Process Act allowed Federal courts to adopt state court 
procedural rules which the court could make “alterations and additions” to). 
32. Id. at 20 (rejecting defense counsel’s argument that the clause would unconstitutionally 
confer legislative authority to the courts). 
33. Id. at 22. 
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the details.”34  The Court emphasized that Congress may never delegate 
power strictly and exclusively within Congress’s Article I enumerated grants 
of power.35 
By the end of the 19th century, the Court was more willing to draw a line 
between permissible and impermissible delegations in Marshall Field & Co. 
v. Clark.36  In Field, the petitioner claimed Congress unconstitutionally 
delegated power to the president by allowing him to initiate or suspend 
reciprocal tariffs on certain goods.37  The Field Court was more explicit than 
the Wayman Court in stating the principle of the nondelegation doctrine: 
“[t]hat [C]ongress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is a 
principle recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system 
of government ordained by the [C]onstitution.”38  However, the Act did 
not vest the president with the power of legislation because Congress 
determined the provisions of the Act and prescribed the duties to be levied, 
collected, and paid; the president only served as a fact-finder to determine 
when the Act of Congress should be enforced.39  While the Court held it 
permissible to allow Congress to prescribe rules and apply the rules 
dependent on executive fact-finding, it would be several decades before the 
modern nondelegation standard took control of nondelegation 
jurisprudence.  
B. Rise of the Intelligible Principle 
As the Progressive Era brought about administrative expansion, the 
desire for agency expediency saw the Court characterize almost any 
delegation of power as non-legislative.40  As the administrative state steadily 
grew, it was a challenge to the president’s ability to adjust custom duties to 
 
34. Id. at 20. 
35. See id. at 20 (“It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any 
other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative”). 
36. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).  
37. The Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 authorized the President to initiate or suspend tariffs on 
sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and animal hides after a finding that a foreign nation imposed tariffs on 
these goods produced in America.  Id. at 680.  The Court recognized that Congress frequently deferred 
to the President when setting standards for trade and commerce and that such routine deference was 
entitled to greater weight when determining if it was an impermissible delegation of authority.  Id. 
at 682.  
38. Id. at 692. 
39. See id. at 692–94 (explaining the Act, in effect, made the president a “mere agent of the law-
making department,” as he was only required to “ascertain and declare the event which its expressed 
will was to take effect”). 
40. Whittington & Iuliano, Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 16, at 399. 
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import barium dioxide, which produced the modern “intelligible principle 
test.”41   
In Hampton,42 a delegation challenge arose after Congress enabled the 
president to adjust tariffs on imported goods under a flexible tariff 
provision, which sought to equalize production costs between the United 
States and foreign countries.43  The Court upheld the delegation by 
reasoning that Congress would be unable to properly regulate tariffs without 
the Tariff Commission and the president.44  In the opinion, 
Chief Justice Taft attempted to provide a clear standard by which to judge 
legislative delegations that became the basis for the doctrine today: “If 
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which 
the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such 
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”45   
Chief Justice Taft reiterated that Congress may never transfer legislative 
power to the president, as that breaches fundamental law, but Congress may 
seek assistance from another branch so long as the co-ordinate branches do 
not assume the others’ constitutional duties.46  The executive did not 
exercise the power of legislation “because nothing involving the expediency 
or just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the 
[p]resident.”47  The president acted as a mere agent of the legislature tasked 
to declare when Congress’s expressed will would take effect.48  Following 
Hampton, the intelligible principle was put to the test as the United States 
experienced significant social, economic, and political change brought on by 
the Great Depression.49 
 
41. The legal test most often used to apply the nondelegation doctrine was first established in 
the early 20th century.  See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)  
(“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation 
of legislative power.”). 
42. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
43. See id. at 400–02 (describing how Congress mandated that the United States Tariff 
Commission investigate the trading conditions on behalf of the president, who would then make the 
final decision based on the Commission’s finding). 
44. Id. at 404–05. 
45. Id. at 409. 
46. Id. at 406. 
47. Id. at 409. 
48. Id. at 410. 
49. See Andrew Ziaja, Hot Oil and Hot Air: The Development of the Nondelegation Doctrine Through the 
New Deal, a History, 1813–1944, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 942 (2008) [hereinafter Ziaja, Hot Oil 
8
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C. Intelligible Principle in Action 
For years after Hampton, the intelligible principle never defeated an act of 
Congress—until 1935, that is.50  During the New Deal, Congress enacted 
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA), a broad-reaching 
statute that empowered the executive to create new administrative agencies 
to regulate significant portions of the U.S. economy to rebuild it.51  
Acting under the authority of Section 9(c) of NIRA, President Roosevelt 
issued executive orders prohibiting interstate trade of petroleum oil 
extracted in excess of state quotas52 and authorized the Secretary of the 
Interior to exercise all powers vested in the presidency to enforce the first 
order.53  In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,54 the Supreme Court was tasked 
with determining whether the authority Congress intended the President to 
exercise under NIRA, concerning, permitting, or prohibiting flows of oil, 
violated the nondelegation doctrine.55  The Court first examined 
Section 9(c), the provision in question.  The section authorized the 
President to stop the flow of oil in interstate or foreign commerce when the 
amount of oil exceeded the amount permitted by any state or state agency.56  
The Court stated: 
Section 9(c) [did] not state whether or in what circumstances or under what 
conditions, the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of 
petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of the state’s 
permission. . . .  It [did] not require any finding by the President as a condition 
of his action. . . .  So far as this section is concerned, it [gave] the President an 
 
and Hot Air] (discussing how the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA) delegated immense 
regulatory power to the president). 
50. See Martin Edwards, Who’s Exercising What Power: Toward a Judicially-Manageable Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 69−70 (2016) (describing how the Court ruled Section 9(c) of NIRA 
violated the nondelegation doctrine for lack of intelligible principle). 
51. Id. at 69; Ziaja, Hot Oil and Hot Air, supra note 49, at 942. 
52. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405–06 (1935).  
53. See id. at 407 (explaining the punishment for violating the prohibition on the interstate 
transport of oil drawn in excess of state quotas was a fine up to $500, up to six months in prison, or 
both). 
54. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).  
55. See id. at 414–15 (“[W]e look to the statute to see whether the Congress has declared a policy 
with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a standard for the President’s action; 
whether the Congress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to enact 
prohibition.”).  
56. Id. at 406. 
9
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unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, 
or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.57 
The Court found that the President acted according to his own judgment 
in deciding whether to permit or prohibit the flow of oil, rather than per 
guidance promulgated by Congress.58  The problem with Section 9(c) was 
that Congress neglected to include conditions or guideposts under which 
the President could control the distribution of petroleum.59  Though 
finding this section violated the nondelegation doctrine, the Court reiterated 
that the Constitution grants Congress the flexibility needed to lay policies 
and establish standards.60 
Several months later, NIRA faced a second loss after the Court struck 
down another provision of the statute in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States.61  Section 3 of NIRA allowed trade and industrial associations 
to develop codes of fair competition, and with the President’s approval, the 
code would become binding law.62  When the code was presented to the 
President for his approval, he did not have to accept or reject it in toto.  
Instead, the President could impose conditions, provide exemptions, and 
create exceptions to provisions of the code that he deemed necessary—all 
of which created binding law.63 
Acting under section 3, President Roosevelt issued an executive order 
creating the “Live Poultry Code” (the Code), which regulated the chain of 
sale from raising to slaughtering chickens.64  A person’s failure to comply 
with the Code was punishable by fines.65  In Schechter, the Court was tasked 
 
57. Id. at 415.  
58. Id. at 418–19.  
59. See id. at 415 (describing Section 9(c) as “brief and unambiguous” as it declared no policy 
regarding the transportation of excess petroleum, and “it g[ave] the President unlimited authority to 
determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition”).  
60. Id. at 421.  
61. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
62. Id. at 522–23 (stating a code would be approved “if the President [found] (1) that such 
associations or groups ‘impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are 
truly representative,’ and (2) that such codes are not designed ‘to promote monopolies or to eliminate 
or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to 
effectuate the policy’ of title I of the act.” (citation omitted)).  
63. Id. at 523. 
64. Id. at 523–24. 
65. See id. (noting the Code only covered a section of the Northeast including New York, New 
Jersey, and Connecticut).  The Code regulated various aspects of the poultry industry including 
employee rights, minimum wage, and minimum work age.  Id. at 521–22.  Violation of the Code was a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $500 for each offense.  Id. at 523. 
10
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with determining whether the President’s authority in establishing the Code 
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.66  In analyzing the 
question, the Court evaluated the limits that Section 3 placed on the exercise 
of presidential power.67  The Court found that Section 3 of NIRA supplied 
“no standards for any trade, industry or activity.”68  Section 3 allowed the 
President unfettered authority to undertake the legislative act of approving 
and proscribing code that regulated trade and industry in the country.69  As 
such, the Court held the President’s code-making authority was an 
unconstitutional act that created “delegation running riot.”70 
The Court has not invoked the nondelegation doctrine since Schechter.  
Subsequently, the intelligible principle that Congress must provide is 
satisfied so long as it “delineates the general policy” for an agency to apply.71  
The intelligible principle standard is seemingly very broad as the Court 
afforded Congress flexibility to delegate power to administrative agencies to 
implement statutes that were characterized as “fair and equitable,”72 “just 
and reasonable,”73 or “in the public interest.”74  All of which are 
comprehensive general policy directives that can be construed in a number 
of ways.  
Like the Wayman Court, the modern Court strongly recognizes that 
nondelegation is fundamental to the constitutional system, but it remains 
difficult to apply.75  The Court hesitates and does not readily invoke the 
 
66. The Schechters were indicted and convicted on eighteen counts under the Live Poultry 
Code.  Id. at 519.  It was on appeal that they challenged the act as an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power.  Id. at 527–28. 
67. Id. at 535, 538. 
68. Id. at 541. 
69. Id. at 541–42. 
70. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
71. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
72. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419–20 (1944) (allowing Congress to delegate 
authority under the Emergency Price Control Act to regulate commodity prices and control inflation 
during wartime).  
73. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944) (allowing Congress 
to delegate authority to the Federal Power Commission to set rates for natural gas).  
74. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943) (allowing Congress to 
delegate authority to the Federal Communications Commission to establish regulations for radio 
stations engaged in chain broadcasting). 
75. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the 
nondelegation doctrine is not “readily enforceable by the courts”); see also Steven F. Huefner, The 
Supreme Court’s Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York: More Than “A Dime’s 
Worth of Difference”, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 337, 415–16 (2000) [hereinafter Huefner, A Dime’s Difference] 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s avoidance of using the nondelegation doctrine); Peter H. Schuck, 
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nondelegation doctrine as it has “never felt qualified to second-guess 
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be 
left to those executing or applying the law.”76  As the Court’s centuries-old 
struggle to draw the line between permissible and impermissible delegation 
continues, it should come as no surprise that the success rate of 
nondelegation challenges in federal courts is virtually nonexistent.  
D. Success Rate of Nondelegation Challenges  
Though the Supreme Court has not employed the intelligible principle 
test of nondelegation to hold an act of Congress unconstitutional for several 
decades, leaving many to declare the doctrine as dead and gone, some argue 
the doctrine is alive and well—particularly in state courts.77  State courts are 
by far the most popular venue for nondelegation challenges as they heard 
85% of all the nondelegation challenges in the post-New Deal era.78  When 
aggregated together, state and federal court nondelegation challenges 
succeed 15% of the time between 1940 and 2015.79  This rate is comparable 
to the 17% success rate of nondelegation challenges from 1789 to 1939, the 
pre-intelligible principle era.80  Such similar rates do not comport with the 
notion that the doctrine is dead.  However, when examining the success rate 
for nondelegation challenges in federal courts over time, the contrast is 
striking.81  
Between 1940 and 2015, only 3% of the 156 nondelegation challenges in 
federal courts were initially successful in invalidating federal action as an 
 
Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 791 (1999) (stating 
the Court’s “line-drawing problem[]” has caused the Court not to implement a “robust nondelegation 
doctrine”). 
76. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
77. The authors compiled a database of state and federal nondelegation cases decided in a year 
divisible by five between 1940 and 2015 to create a representative sample of nondelegation cases post-
New Deal.  See Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619, 635−36 (2017) [hereinafter Iuliano & Washington, The Nondelegation 
Doctrine: Alive and Well] (finding the large majority of nondelegation cases during this time frame took 
place in state courts).  
78. Id. at 636. 
79. Id. at 635−36. 
80. Id. at 636. 
81. Compare Whittington & Iuliano, Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 16, at 426 (noting 
the invalidation rate of nondelegation challenges in federal courts after 1880), with Iuliano & 
Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, supra note 77, at 636 (noting the invalidation rate 
of nondelegation challenges in federal courts between 1940 and 2015). 
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unconstitutional delegation of power.82  However, four of the five initially 
successful cases were reversed on appeal—leaving an actual success rate of 
0.6%.83  Meanwhile, the challenges to nondelegation in state courts 
maintained a comparable invalidation rate of 17% and 16%, respectively, 
during those time frames.84 
An important distinction must be noted between federal and state 
nondelegation doctrine practice.  Unlike the U.S. Constitution’s inherent 
nondelegation principle, most state constitutions enumerate a specific 
nondelegation principle.85  By enumerating such provisions in their 
constitutions, states make their commitment to the separation of powers 
clear86 and provide a valuable tool for judicial review.87  Since state 
constitutions contain nondelegation clauses in much greater detail than the 
U.S. Constitution, it is no surprise that state courts seldom cite the 
Constitution when discussing the nondelegation doctrine.88  
While sharing the same spirit for protecting liberty by preventing tyranny, 
federal and state nondelegation doctrines are the same in name only, which 
is why there is a more robust application of the doctrine in state courts.  The 
federal nondelegation doctrine’s inherent nature and uncodified case law 
mandate may provide part of the reason why the doctrine is not active in 
the federal courts. 
As the People’s agents in Congress, the Constitution presupposes that 
congresspeople will exercise the legislative will independently, but the 
principle of nondelegation has never been understood to create a substantial 
 
82. Iuliano & Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, supra note 77, at 636.  
83. Id.  
84. Id. 
85. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be 
divided into three distinct departments . . . and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of 
these departments, shall exercise any powers properly attached to either of the others . . . .”); S.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 8 (“In the government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of 
the government shall be forever separate and distinct for each other, and no person or persons 
exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.”). 
86. Aside from creating a clear emphasis that state government is a system of separation of 
powers, many provisions in state constitutions forbid the passage of law contingent on any outside 
authority.  Whittington & Iuliano, Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 16, at 416 (citing IND. 
CONST. art. I, § 25).  Similarly, many state constitutions contain provisions explicitly forbidding the 
legislature to delegate any powers.  Id. (referencing COLO. CONST. art. V, § 35). 
87. Nevertheless, even with strong textual support preventing broad swaths of delegation, state 
courts are often still willing to defer to the legislature in determining when delegation is practical and 
necessary.  Id. at 417. 
88. Id. 
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burden for Congress.89  The federal legislature undoubtedly will come 
across issues that are impracticable for it to answer without turning to a 
body of experts to fill up the policy details.90  Therefore, the issue of 
permissible congressional delegation turns into a question of degree.91  In 
Herman Gundy’s mind, Congress went a degree too far when it delegated 
authority to the U.S. Attorney General in deciding how a legislative act 
would apply to pre-act offenders.92  
III.    GUNDY V. UNITED STATES AND A FEVERISH DISSENT   
A. The Plurality Holding  
In Gundy, the Court ruled against Herman Gundy in a 4–1–3 plurality 
opinion.93  In 2006, Congress passed the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA or the Act), which established a national, 
comprehensive sex offender registration system.94  The Act imposes 
criminal penalties on convicted sex offenders who knowingly fail to register 
 
89. Id. 
90. See St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 211 (1902) (noting there would be 
no objection to delegating law-making power to experts in the field of mining for specific issues).  
91. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
92. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2122 (2019). 
93. Justice Kagan announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion which 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined.  Justice Alito concurred only in the judgment.  
Justice Gorsuch dissented with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined.  Id. at 2116.  Many 
commentators have ridiculed plurality opinions as nothing more than “juridical cripples.”  See generally 
Linda Novak, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 760 
(1980) (citing John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme 
Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59 (1968).  But behind the alleged juridical cripple is perhaps the greatest benefit 
of plurality opinions—judicial freedom and flexibility.  Id. at 66.  Pluralities provide greater judicial 
freedom because a Justice need not limit his views to obtain majority support; therefore, a Justice is 
free to engage in a creative analysis to tackle a divisive or undecided issue knowing that his attempt to 
create innovative views will not be binding on lower courts.  Id.  
 Not only do pluralities provide Justices with more freedom, but they also allow greater freedom 
to the lower courts because they allow the judges the chance to distinguish future cases instead of 
always following strict precedent.  Id. at 62.  Such freedom among the Justices and judges aid in the 
sound development of the law by allowing individual positions to be well articulated instead of forcing 
a compromised agreement.  Plurality opinions are often well written, coherent, and thoughtful 
explanations of the Justice’s rationale to clarify the issue and convince others to respect and follow his 
position.  As discussion increases with multiple rationales proposed, the law develops as jurists may 
coalesce around a specific proposition or train of thought.  See generally id. (discussing the precedential 
value of plurality opinions for the Supreme Court)). 
94. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (2019) (referencing Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–91). 
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and who travel in interstate commerce.95  While Congress detailed 
registration requirements for sex offenders convicted after the Act’s 
passage, it left the U.S. Attorney General the discretion to “specify the 
applicability” of the Act’s requirements to sex offenders convicted before 
its passage.96  The provision states: 
The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of 
the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the 
enactment of this chapter . . . and to prescribe rules for the registration of any 
such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable 
to comply with subsection (b).97 
Acting under his delegated authority, the then-Attorney General issued a 
final ruling in 2010 mandating SORNA’s registration requirements applied 
in full to pre-Act offenders.98  In 2005, Petitioner Gundy pleaded guilty 
under Maryland law to sexually assaulting a minor; thereafter, Gundy was 
released from prison in 2012 and moved to New York.99  Gundy never 
registered as a sex offender and was subsequently convicted under SORNA 
for not satisfying the registration requirement.100  
Gundy challenged his conviction, in part, as an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative authority to the Attorney General by allowing him 
to decide how SORNA’s registration requirements would apply to pre-Act 
offenders.101  He challenged the provision as granting “unguided” and 
“unchecked” power to the Attorney General.102  In determining if the Act 
provided an intelligible principle, the inquiry began with statutory 
interpretation to ascertain the statute’s meaning to determine if executive 
discretion is sufficiently guided.103  Only after the Court determined the 
meaning of the challenged provision could it decide whether the discretion 
 
95. Sex offenders who fail to register can be imprisoned for up to ten years.  Id. at 2121  
(citing Failure to Register, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)). 
96. Id. at 2122 (quoting Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d)). 
97. Id. (quoting Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d)). 
98. The Court refers to sex offenders who were convicted before SORNA’s passage as  
“pre-Act offenders.”  Id. (quoting Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81849, 




102. Id. at 2123 (“[The provision] does not give the Attorney General anything like the 
‘unguided’ and ‘unchecked’ authority that Gundy says.”). 
103. Id. (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001)). 
15
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allowed was constitutional.104  The plurality states that a fundamental canon 
of construction is to read the statute’s words in context within the overall 
statutory scheme.105  When tasked with a nondelegation challenge, the 
Court gives “narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might 
otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”106  Moreover, the Court 
often looks beyond the context and towards the statute’s history and 
purpose to further determine the meaning of the language.107 
The plurality determined section 20913(d) “require[d] the Attorney 
General to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible.”108  
Justice Kagan found the court properly determined the provision’s statutory 
meaning seven years earlier in Reynolds v. United States,109 which “effectively 
resolved” the issue before the Gundy court.110  The Court’s holistic 
endeavor of statutory interpretation began with SORNA’s declaration of 
purpose to create a comprehensive national sex offender database.111  
According to the plurality, the term “comprehensive,”112 “could not fit the 
system SORNA created if the Attorney General could decline, for any 
reason or no reason at all, to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders.”113  
Furthermore, the plurality contends that the Act’s definition of sex 
 
104. Id. at 2129. 
105. Id. at 2126 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 
(2007)). 
106. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (citing Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. 
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 
342 (1974)).  
107. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2126 (2019) (citing Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 78 (2013)). 
108. Id. at 2123 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 442–43 (2012)). 
109. See Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 442 (2012) (noting SORNA’s broad definition 
of “sex offender” “include[s] any ‘individual who was convicted of a sex offense.’”).  
110. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2124.  In Reynolds, the Court determined whether the SORNA 
registration requirements applied to pre-Act offenders once the law was enacted by Congress or if the 
requirements did not apply until the Attorney General said they did.  Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 437.   
The Court settled on the latter approach and held SORNA did not apply to pre-Act offenders until 
the Attorney General mandated the requirements apply.  Id. at 435.  In part, the Court reasoned that 
an instantaneous registration mandate for pre-Act offenders might not have been feasible, as the 
registration requirements largely diverged from state law.  See id. at 440–41 (discussing the feasibility of 
automatically applying SORNA registration requirements to pre-Act offenders).  To resolve difficulties, 
the Court determined Congress assigned to the Department of Justice the responsibility examine the 
issues and apply the registration requirements accordingly (i.e., as soon as feasible).  Id. at 441. 
111. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2124 (noting Reynolds presumed it was Congress’s intent for “SORNA’s 
registration requirements to apply to pre-Act offenders.”). 
112. The Court defined comprehensive to mean “something that is all encompassing or 
sweeping.”  Id. at 2126–27. 
113. Id. at 2127. 
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offender—“an individual who was convicted of a sex offense”—uses past 
tense language, meaning the Act does not apply just to future offenders.114  
Justice Kagan found such construction of the words were supported by the 
legislative history as the need to register those convicted of sexual assault 
was a prime issue for Congress.115 
Turning to back to Section 20913(d), when read as a whole, the text 
created a practical problem for Congress to apply the Act to pre-Act 
offenders because the Act assumed that offenders were in prison when, in 
fact, pre-Act offenders were not.”116  Justice Kagan identified this problem 
as meaning SORNA required the Attorney General to resolve practical 
problems of registering pre-Act offenders by determining how to apply 
SORNA as opposed to whether to apply it to pre-Act offenders at all.117  
The contentions resulted in the plurality’s finding the “text, . . . context, 
purpose, and history, makes clear that the Attorney General’s discretion 
extends only to considering and addressing feasibility issues.”118  In 
addressing the feasibility issues of the Act, the Attorney General is only 
determining administrative issues, and therefore, the Act is within 
constitutional bounds of delegation.119  Yet again, the Court found the 
federal agency just determined the “how” element of a policy enacted by 
Congress: “Congress [can still] routinely [delegate] its legislative power, even 
though the doctrine pretends it does not.”120  The tradition continues.  
Gundy marked yet another moment in the Court’s nondelegation history 
where rationally minded individuals greatly differed as to the preferred 
outcome of the case.  As expected, staunch opposition from other members 
of the Court met the plurality’s opinion.121  
B. An Invitation to Litigate?  
The plurality’s ruling securing a judgment against Gundy received support 
from Justice Alito’s concurrence.122  Nevertheless, Justice Alito noted his 




116. Id. at 2128. 
117. Id. at 2128–29. 
118. Id. at 2123–24. 
119. Id. at 2129–30.  
120. Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 361 (2017).  
121. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131. 
122. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
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“pursuant to extraordinarily [capricious] standards.”123  Furthermore, 
Justice Alito signaled his support for the Court’s revisiting and possibly 
revising their nondelegation approach in the future.124  Though 
Justice Alito thought it would be “freakish” 125 to revisit the nondelegation 
approach with the Gundy case, at least three of his colleagues thought the 
time was right.126 
C. The Gorsuch Dissent 
Justice Gorsuch strongly dissented to the plurality’s holding.127  He 
criticized the plurality as having reimagined SORNA’s terms through 
statutory interpretation to conclude that Congress is not granting the 
Attorney General too much power.128  He lambasted the plurality’s 
settlement on the feasibility standard as a “figment of the government’s 
(very recent) imagination” because Section 20913(d) says nothing about 
feasibility nor did the Department of Justice discuss feasibility in its 
rulemaking.129  Even if SORNA directed the Attorney General to establish 
a comprehensive national system, he disagreed with the plurality’s 
interpretation of the word “comprehensive.”130  In Justice Gorsuch’s view, 
SORNA’s wording gives the Attorney General unbridled power to 
determine the rules for up to a half-million pre-Act offenders in the U.S.131      
Additionally, Justice Gorsuch notes that various Attorneys General have 
differing opinions on how SORNA should be applied to pre-Act 
 
123. Id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
124. See id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider 
the approach taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”). 
125. Id.  
126. Id. 
127. See id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Today, a plurality of an eight-member Court endorses 
this extraconstitutional arrangement but resolves nothing.”). 
128. See id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plurality reimagines the terms of the statute before 
us and insists there is nothing wrong with Congress handing off so much power to the Attorney 
General.”).  Justice Gorsuch also seemingly criticized Congress for passing the problem of how 
SORNA would affect pre-Act offenders to the Attorney General to avoid “impos[ing] unpopular and 
costly burdens on States and localities . . . .”  Id. at 2131–32 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
129. Id. at 2145–46 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
130. See id. at 2146 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing 3 Oxford English Dictionary 632 (2d ed. 
1989) (discussing how the word “comprehensive” should properly be interpreted in respect to creating 
a “comprehensive national system”)).  
131. Id. at 2132 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d), “The Attorney General shall have the authority to . . . prescribe rules for the 
registration of any [pre-Act offender].”). 
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offenders.132  As a result, he charges the fate of pre-Act offenders is 
constantly in limbo as SORNA’s application to pre-Act offenders is subject 
to change at the pleasure of the current Attorney General.133  
Justice Gorsuch not only took issue with the nondelegation doctrine as 
applied in Gundy, but he also challenged the Court’s approach to 
nondelegation as a whole.134 
Recognizing the Court “must call foul when constitutional lines are 
crossed,” Justice Gorsuch questioned what an appropriate nondelegation 
test should look like.135  Though the government structure is established 
on the principle of separation of powers, Justice Gorsuch does acknowledge 
permissible acts of delegation.136  However, he argues as the administrative 
state has grown, the “intelligible principle” test became grossly 
misunderstood and misused.137   
In his view, the intelligible principle remark in J.W. Hampton was just 
another way to state the traditional rule that Congress may delegate to the 
executive branch to act as a fact-finder and fill in gaps for a controlling 
general policy enacted by Congress.138  Instead of echoing the traditional 
rule, the phrase was isolated and eventually displaced prior Court 
rationale.139  While it has been several decades since the Court has held a 
statute improperly delegated power without an intelligible principle, 
 
132. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
133. See id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (detailing how different Attorneys General apply SORNA 
to pre-Act offenders as they come into office).  
134. Justice Gorsuch began his argument by discussing the founders’ commitment to establish 
a government where rulemaking authority rested on the consent of the people through their 
representatives in Congress.  Central to the system of government is the separation of powers, which 
ensures the consent of the people to rulemaking authority is only exercised by those duly elected as 
their representatives in Congress.  See id. at 2133–35 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing the founders’ 
intent to create a government of separate powers which he argues is not reflected in the Court’s modern 
nondelegation approach).  
135. Id. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
136. First, he acknowledges that after Congress makes the policy decision regulating private 
conduct, it may refer to the executive branch to “fill up the details,” so long as Congress’s guidance is 
followed.  Id. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  Second, after promulgating rules that govern private 
conduct, Congress may leave the application of the rules to executive fact-finding.  Id. (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting).  Finally, executive and judicial branches may be assigned non-legislative responsibilities by 
Congress when the legislative authority overlaps with similar authority that the Constitution also vests 
in another branch of government.  Id. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
137. See id. at 2138–40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“This mutated version of the ‘intelligible 
principle’ remark has no basis in . . . the Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it 
was plucked.”). 
138. Id. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. at 2139–40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Gorsuch highlights the Court’s ability to regulate Congress’s 
attempts to delegate power using different doctrines.140 
Justice Gorsuch states three questions must be asked to determine 
whether a statute provides a true intelligible principle: “Does the statute 
assign to the executive only the responsibility to make factual findings?  
Does it set forth the facts that the executive must consider and the criteria 
against which to measure them?  And most importantly, did Congress, and 
not the Executive Branch, make the policy judgments?”141  While SORNA 
fails to satisfy an intelligible principle standard in his view, Justice Gorsuch 
is adamant that applying separation of powers does not determine policy 
outcomes, but instead provides procedural protections for individual 
liberties.142  Even though the Gundy Court declined to reevaluate the 
nondelegation standard, Justice Gorsuch remains hopeful that, in the future, 
with a full panel, the Court will ensure that Congress may obtain 
“considerable assistance from the executive branch” while upholding the 
separation of powers and ensuring individual liberties.143  While Gundy lost 
his appeal with the plurality and concurring votes, he launched a last attempt 
to change the outcome with a hearing in front of a full Court. 
D. A Plea for Rehearing  
A ruling from the Supreme Court is not necessarily the end of the case as 
the parties may petition for a rehearing “within 25 days . . . of the judgment 
or decision.”144  A petition for rehearing should “state the grounds briefly 
and distinctly” and will only be granted if “a majority of the Court, [agrees] 
at the instance of” one who votes in the majority or concurrence.145  
Herman Gundy timely filed a petition for rehearing requesting all nine 
 
 
140. For example, under the major question’s doctrine, the Court has been unwilling to let an 
agency fill in statutory gaps when the statutory scheme’s central issue deals with a question of great 
political or economic significance.  Additionally, Justice Gorsuch notes how it would be easy to reframe 
a nondelegation challenge as a void-for-vagueness challenge by asserting the act in question does not 
contain definite and precise standards for determining whether the will of Congress was followed.  Id. 
at 2141–42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
141. Id. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
142. See id. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is a procedural guarantee that requires 
Congress to assemble a social consensus before choosing our nation’s course on policy questions like 
those implicated by SORNA.”). 
143. Id. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
144. SUP. CT. R. 44.1. 
145. Id. 
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members of the Court decide his case.146 
In his petition, Gundy argued that the decision of the Court was 
essentially a tie of an equally divided eight-member court.147  He asserts a 
rehearing is proper when it appears likely that a majority of the Court may 
be persuaded one way or the other upon rehearing—especially “when a new 
Justice . . . can break a tie.”148  Gundy equates the outcome in his case to a 
tie—four justices in favor of SORNA without reservation and four justices 
expressing skepticism—which should be broken by a full nine-member 
court.149 
However, this is not a well-drawn comparison.  While Justice Alito stated 
he would support the Court’s reconsideration of the nondelegation 
approach,150 it is improper to lump Justice Alito’s concurrence in with the 
dissent to create a “tie.”151  The dissent finds the provision in SORNA is 
an unconstitutional delegation of power,152 while Justice Alito states “it 
would be freakish to single out” this SORNA provision to reconsider the 
nondelegation approach.153  Since Justice Alito favors a reconsideration of 
the nondelegation approach, but did not think it is was appropriate with the 
SORNA provision at issue, it is unlikely that he supported a rehearing in the 
case.  Therefore, it comes as no surprise the Court denied Gundy’s petition 
for rehearing after it was relisted for conference several times154 and a final 
judgment of the case was issued.155 
It is worth noting that perhaps Justice Alito’s concurrence was also a 
strategic move on his part.156  Though we will never know, this is likely part 
 
146. After Justice Kennedy’s retirement at the time of oral argument, the Court had a temporary 
vacancy.  Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court four days after it heard oral argument in the case.  Petition 
for Rehearing at 1–2, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17–6086), 2019 WL 3202508, at *1–4.   
147. Id. at *3.   
148. Id. (quoting EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 15.6(a) at 816 
(9th ed. 2007)).  
149. Id. at *4.   
150. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring). 
151. See id. at 2131 (showing Gundy was decided by a plurality opinion). 
152. Id. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
153. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring). 
154. See John Elwood, Relist Watch, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 19, 2019, 2:39 PM), https://www. 
scotusblog.com/2019/11/relist-watch-154/ [https://perma.cc/72JW-KXWM] (cataloging the dates 
that Gundy’s petition for rehearing was relisted for conference).   
155. Gundy v. United States, SCOTUS BLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ 
gundy-v-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/9AGJ-Y5KM]. 
156. Perhaps Justice Alito chose to concur only in judgment because if he sided with the dissent, 
a 4-4 tie would have resulted in leaving the lower court’s decision in place and changing nothing.  In a 
4-4 tie, no opinion of the Court is written, which also means no dissenting opinions.  Maybe 
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of the reason the petition was denied.  Moreover, the Court’s long-held 
custom that a new justice—“that is, those who did not participate in the 
original decision”—should not vote on a petition for rehearing.157  This is 
likely in an attempt to prohibit the new justice from influencing a case 
decided before his or her arrival to the Court.  As in prior petitions for a 
rehearing, this custom was followed, and Justice Kavanaugh took no part in 
the petitions’ consideration.158  As discussed in a later section, it is 
interesting to imagine how this case might have been decided had 
Justice Kavanagh participated.  For the time being, the intelligible principle 
is the standard by which federal courts determine nondelegation challenges.  
E. A Divided Court  
The Court agreed on one thing in Gundy—Article I of the Constitution 
prohibits the delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies.  
Nevertheless, the deep division between the Justices comes from where and 
how to draw the line of what is “legislative power.”159  Such a division from 
the Court will have lingering effects.  
 
Justice Alito purposefully chose to concur so that Justice Gorsuch could write his dissent calling for a 
reconsideration of the nondelegation approach.  After all, it is Justice Gorsuch’s dissent that advocated 
for reinvigorating the nondelegation debate.  Along with Justice Alito’s welcoming future challenges 
to the doctrine, none of this would have occurred had Justice Alito voted with the dissent.  
157. Brian De Vito, Comment, When U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Are Not Final: An Examination 
of the Rehearing Rule and the Court’s Application of it in Kennedy v. Louisiana, SETON HALL L. 17 (2010), 
https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=student_scholarship 
[https://perma.cc/HN8V-4BU9] [hereinafter De Vito, Examination of the Rehearing Rule] (citing 
EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 816–17 (9th ed. 2007)). 
158. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130. 
159. While the Justices have failed to coalesce on when or how to draw a nondelegation line, 
many others have articulated their approach to the nondelegation issue.  Professor Schoenbrod says 
the critical question to determine permissible delegations is whether the statute sets out rules or goals.  
To him, the statute must set out rules of conduct and not just a set of goals for the executive to work 
towards.  Congress cannot merely announce ambition for the executive to seek; the Constitution 
demands to specify how and to what extend the executive should realize the ambition.  To him, a “rules 
statute” is enough to determine permissible delegations, therefore qualifying as valid legislation.  Gary 
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 372–73 (2002) (citing David Schoenbrod, 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH 
DELEGATION 181–89 (1993)).  Professor Redish proposed a “political commitment” approach to 
nondelegation issues.  Since lawmakers are the People’s agents in Congress, he proposes that statutes 
must contain a meaningful political commitment level.  Statutes that do not make such a commitment 
should be considered as a simple mandate to the Executive Branch to create policy.  A court can 
determine whether a statute announces a political commitment by ascertaining if the statute is more 
likely to inform voters about their representative’s position based on whether she voted for or against 
the act.  Id. at 374–75 (citing Martin H. Redish, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE  
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In precedential fashion, the case turned on a narrow construction of the 
statutory scheme at issue to seemingly avoid an unconstitutional delegation 
issue.  While stare decisis mandates the narrow construction of the statutory 
scheme, such an approach is not without strong criticism.160  Though the 
Court has never second-guessed Congress regarding the degree of policy 
judgment left to agencies, the narrow construction given to statutory 
schemes heightens the level of deference to the point of always ascertaining 
an intelligible principle even when a challenged provision, like 
Section 20913(d), contains zero boundary language.  
Justices Kagan and Gorsuch share “a fundamental disagreement . . . on 
how to operationalize nondelegation as a matter of constitutional 
doctrine.”161  The plurality seeks to maintain the status quo of the 
deferential intelligible principle while the dissent favors a set of more 
formalized rules for future dealing with administrative law to create a more 
robust distinction between fact-finding and determining elements of policy 
within executive agencies.   
Though Justice Gorsuch articulated a powerful dissent in Gundy, what 
difference does it make?  Dissenters are the “losers,” so why do many 
consider his dissent to be so important? 
 
136–37 (1995)); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, If Angels Were to Govern: The Need for Pragmatic 
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 453–56 (1991); see also Brief for the Pacific 
Legal Foundation, supra note 9, at 19–22 (advocating the Court adopt void for vagueness standards in 
its application and evaluation of the nondelegation doctrine).  
160. Narrow construction of a statutory scheme may be worthy of strong condemnation on 
multiple fronts.  First, by “narrow[ly] [construing] a statute by rewriting it” using legislative history and 
purpose, the Court “threatens to unsettle the legislative choice implicit in adopting a broadly worded 
statute.”  Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion, supra note 5, at 175 (quoting John F. Manning, The 
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 228 (2000)).  There is a fine line 
between statutory interpretation and statutory rewriting.  While a court must engage in interpretation 
to fully ascertain the meaning of a statute, a court can just as easily impute the background of the statute 
to conform with its predetermined “interpretation.”  Second, some criticize constitutional avoidance 
as creating tension with the Chevron doctrine.  Chevron “reasoned that Congress [might] enact open-
ended statutes” because the federal agencies tasked with enforcing the statutes possess greater expertise 
in for interpreting and administering the statute.  Chevron’s approach shows the Court’s support for 
deference to administrative agencies when the agencies are implementing a broad statute.  Yet, when 
evaluating constraints on delegations of power in broad statutes, the Court engages in a narrow 
construction of statute for nondelegation purposes.  Id. at 176 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)).  Such an approach with the nondelegation doctrine 
contradicts the approach mandated by the Chevron doctrine because an agency seeks deference by 
asking for a broad interpretation of a statute yet nondelegation mandates a narrow construction.   
161. Id. at 167. 
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F. What Purpose Do Dissents Provide?  
Historically, judicial dissents serve as a protest by the losing side as they 
spar with the majority or plurality’s rationale.162  Perhaps dissents serve a 
greater function than just a paper protest.  For example, the careful crafting 
of a dissent creates an intellectual exchange that often enhances the quality 
of court opinions.163  Opinions of the Court are not always as coherent and 
complete as they appear, and dissents serve as a spotlight on the shaky or 
unclear reasoning of the Court as Justices seek to create the ideal 
precedential rationale for lower courts.164 
An essential role dissents play is to “push[] the reasoning of future cases” 
closer to the rationale of the dissenter’s view.165  A dissenter can accomplish 
this by questioning elements of the majority’s or plurality’s rationale and 
advocating a sounder approach to the issue.166  The law is shaped by new 
understandings that a dissent contributes to as the dissenter seeks to clarify 
differing rationales to create a clearer result.167  As dissents question the 
Court’s opinion, the exchange of ideas often clarifies and helps develop the 
law.  
When it comes to plurality opinions, dissents are often considered by 
lower court judges while attempting to determine which rationale should 
carry precedential effect.168  This is where Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is likely 
to have the most impact.  The intelligible principle remains the standard that 
courts use to evaluate nondelegation challenges; however, the dissent is 
likely to cause others to question whether the current intelligible principle is 
the best approach.  
Justice Gorsuch criticized the intelligible principle as too weak while 
favoring delegation that allows another branch to fill up a statute’s 
details.169  Though differing on the degree of deference afforded to 
statutory delegation, the plurality and dissent converge on the same 
fundamental analysis as both assess the boundaries to cabin executive 
 
162. Randall T. Shepard, Notable Dissents in State Constitutional Cases: What Can Dissents Teach Us?, 
68 ALB. L. REV. 337, 339 (2005). 
163. Id. at 338.   
164. Id. at 340. 
165. Id. at 342–43. 
166. Id. at 343. 
167. Id. at 347–48. 
168. See Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 808–18 (2017) (discussing three different ways lower court judges can determine 
the precedential force of a plurality opinion). 
169. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2143 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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discretion.170  It is Justice Gorsuch’s advocation for more robust delegation 
requirements that is likely to shape the future of administrative law as courts 
encounter more nondelegation cases, perhaps due in part to Justice Alito’s 
calling for such challenges.171 
In calling out the plurality’s constitutional fouls, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent 
sparked a conversation on how nondelegation should look in the future.  
Either Congress or the courts can narrow the scope of delegated power.  
Naturally, a lower court may find a delegation issue if the judge shares a 
similar view with Justice Gorsuch.  The number of judges with similar views 
in the federal judiciary is likely growing thanks to the current presidential 
administration.  
As President Trump continues to appoint new federal judges, the federal 
judiciary may soon contain a majority of judges who, like Justice Gorsuch, 
favor strong separation of powers and a more robust nondelegation 
doctrine.  As a result, perhaps a future approach to nondelegation will look 
a lot more formalized, as Justice Gorsuch promotes. 
IV.    A CHANGING FEDERAL JUDICIARY  
The authority vested in President Trump via expressed enumerations in 
the Constitution can be categorized as: martial,172 diplomatic,173 
executive,174 legislative,175 and judicial.176  President Trump’s ability to 
shape the federal judiciary will leave his mark on American law long after he 
is no longer president.177  The President’s appointment power allows him 
to “legitimately attempt to influence the outcome of cases in ways that agree 
 
170. Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion, supra note 5, at 168.  
171. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
172. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (stating the president of the United States is the 
Commander in Chief of the United States military forces).  
173. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (stating the president of the United States shall receive 
ambassadors and public ministers).  
174. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (stating the president of the United States is vested with 
executive power).  
175. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 (stating the president of the United States shall report the State 
of the Union to Congress from time to time).  
176. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating the president of the United States shall have power to 
appoint judges to the Supreme Court). 
177. See Stacy Hawkins, Trump’s Dangerous Judicial Legacy, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 20,  
33–34 (2019) (“Trump’s judicial legacy is likely to be felt for generation to come and will be difficult 
to reverse over the next several successive presidential administrations.”). 
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with [his] political views.”178  While on the campaign trail, before Trump 
became president, he promised to nominate conservative judges picked in 
coordination with the Federalist Society.179  The Federalist Society brands 
itself as:  
[A] group of conservatives and libertarians . . . founded on the principles . . . 
that the separation of governmental powers is central to [the] Constitution, 
and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what 
the law is, not what it should be.180 
Of course, the President’s nominees must be approved before taking the 
bench,181 but with a Republican-controlled Senate that has clearly not been 
an issue.182 
President Trump has appointed three jurists to the Supreme Court—
Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett—all of whom were suggested to 
the President by the Federalist Society.183  Having been recommended by 
the Federalist Society, it is safe to say these Justices strongly support the 
separation of powers and the Constitution.184  Justice Gorsuch’s view of 
the law did not bring much change to the Court as he replaced the late-
 
178. Quinn W. Crowley, Sticks, Stones, and So-Called Judges: Why the Era of Trump Necessitates 
Revisiting Presidential Influence on the Courts, 94 IND. L.J. SUPP. 13, 16 (2018) [hereinafter Crowley, Sticks, 
Stones, and So-Called Judges] (citing Stephen M. Engle, AMERICAN POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE 
COURT: OPPOSITION POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL POWER 323 (2011)).  
179. Ian Millhiser, What President Trump Has Done to the Courts, Explained, VOX (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/9/20962980/trump-supreme-court-federal-judg 
es [https://perma.cc/F35M-XPCR]; see also Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the Conservative 
Counterrevolution, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1698, 1704–05 (2018) (discussing the list put together with 
the help of the Federalist Society and released by then-candidate Trump, which consisted of twenty-
one potential Supreme Court nominees to replace the late Justice Scalia).  Such action is not unusual 
though, as presidents do not have personal knowledge of specific nominees and therefore reach out 
for advisors and external sources for recommendation.  Crowley, Sticks, Stones, and So-Called Judges, supra 
note 177, at 28 (citing Lee Epstein et al., The Increasing Importance of Ideology in the Nomination and 
Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 609, 611 (2008)).   
180. Southworth, supra note 179, at 1715.  
181. See Carl Tobias, President Donald Trump and Federal Bench Diversity, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
ONLINE 400, 403 (2018) (discussing the roles the Senate and other departments and organizations play 
in determining whether the nominee should be allowed to take the bench). 
182. Id. at 413. 
183. Southworth, supra note 179, at 1715; Ben Schreckinger, ‘She’s Been Groomed for this Moment’: 
Amy Barrett’s Supreme Court Preparation Began Early, POLITICO (Sept. 20, 2020, 10:24 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/20/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-419219 [https:// 
perma.cc/3HPX-R8XH].  
184. Southworth, supra note 179, at 1713. 
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Justice Scalia, an original sponsor and member of the Federalist Society, a 
man with whom he shared many of the same viewpoints.185  
President Trump’s appointment of Justice Kavanaugh, a hardline 
conservative, has changed the dynamic of the Court as he replaced 
Justice Kennedy, a moderate conservative.186  Moreover, the President’s 
appointment of Justice Barrett, another hardline conservative, to fill the seat 
left by late-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a liberal icon187 and notorious 
judicial activist,188 solidified a conservative majority on the Court.189  
These appointments pushed the Court further to the right as these 
conservative jurists, with life tenure on the Court,190 are young and will 
remain on the Court shaping the law long after President Trump leaves 
office.  Though when Gundy’s case was argued before the Court, the Court 
had yet to move further right.191 
A. A Missing Justice 
It is important to note that Justice Kavanaugh had not yet taken  
his seat on the Court at the time of the Gundy decision and therefore played 
no role in the case.192  Before taking his seat on the Court, 
Justice Kavanaugh’s work shows a jurist who takes seriously separation of 
powers and favors a constrained ability for executive agencies to regulate  
 
185. Id. 
186. Millhiser, supra note 179; see also Hawkins, Trump’s Dangerous Judicial Legacy, supra note 177, 
at 22 (2019) (stating there was an ideological shift in the Supreme Court with the retirement of 
Justice Kennedy). 
187. Lisa Hirshman, Book Excerpt: Sisters in Law: How Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg Went to the Supreme Court and Changed the World, 40 HARBINGER 69, 70, 72–73 (2015).  
188. Keith E. Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History?  The Roberts Court and the 
Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2219, 2220 (2014).  
189. Seung Min Kim, Senate Confirms Barrett to Supreme Court, Cementing Its Conservative Majority, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020, 8:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/ 
senate-court-barrett-trump/2020/10/26/df76c07e-1789-11eb-befb-8864259bd2d8_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/TCA7-U5EP]. 
190. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 (stating that judges on the Supreme Court and inferior courts 
hold their position “during good behavior”).  
191. Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: How the Roberts Court Could Alter the Administrative State, 
ABA J., http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-the-roberts-court-could-alter-the-
administrative-state [https://perma.cc/4MBF-24ND]. 
192. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019).  President Trump nominated 
Justice Kavanaugh to the Court to fill the seat by retiring Justice Kennedy, but at the time of Gundy the 
Senate had not yet confirmed Justice Kavanaugh.  Southworth, supra note 179, at 1705.  
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broadly.193  The addition of Justice Kavanaugh to the bench caused 
commentators to see a new direction for administrative law coming from 
the Court.194  Like Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh’s record shows he 
typically urges less judicial deference to federal administrative agencies’ 
decisions.195 
Recently, Justice Kavanaugh concurred in a denial of certiorari in a 
petition that raised the same statutory interpretation issue the Court 
addressed in Gundy.196  Certiorari was denied because the Gundy Court 
already answered the question.  Nevertheless, Justice Kavanaugh 
acknowledged: “Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s 
nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further 
consideration in future cases.”197  This shows Justice Kavanaugh silently 
questions the current doctrine because if he agreed with the current 
approach, he would not find that it warrants further consideration.  Perhaps 
his concurrence is like Justice Alito’s in that it welcomes future delegation 
challenges by announcing his willingness to question the Court’s approach 
should another delegation question come before the Court.198  If 
Justice Kavanaugh participated in the Gundy decision, the outcome might 
have been different as all signs point to his favoring a strong application of 
the nondelegation doctrine like Justice Gorsuch.199 
 
193. Christopher Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation of Powers, SCOTUS 
BLOG (July 26, 2018, 2:55 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-administrative-
law-and-separation-of-powers/ [https://perma.cc/4EYW-LE2J].  
194. See Chemerinsky, supra note 191 (“With Kavanaugh on the bench, it is easy to see five 
justices who will be willing to revive the nondelegation doctrine and bring about a dramatic change in 
administrative law.”); see also Yoo & Phillips, supra note 8 (discussing how the current administrative 
state does not comport with the vision of the founders and how the addition of Justice Kavanaugh to 
the Court may result in the Court reigning in the administrative state).   
195. Chemerinsky, supra note 191. 
196. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  
197. Id. 
198. Chemerinsky, supra note 191. 
199. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Kavanaugh served as a judge on 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals—the court which hears the most administrative law cases in the 
United States.  During his twelve years on the bench for the D.C. Circuit, he heard over 300 cases 
which clearly show he is a jurist committed to separation of powers like Justice Gorsuch.  He advocates 
for reading the precise wording of constitutional text while being mindful of its history and tradition.  
In doing so, he believes it ensures each branch stays constrained by its enumerated powers and 
prohibits infringement upon other branches while protecting individual liberty.  Judge Kavanagh and the 
Constitution, SENATE RPC (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/judge-
kavanaugh-and-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/5HBT-FXKC].  Having heard over 300 cases, one 
can see Justice Kavanaugh’s commitment to separation of powers in his writings from the court.  See, 
e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 855 F.3d 381, 419 (2017) (Kavanagh, J., 
28
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B. Justice Barrett on Nondelegation 
Unlike Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett’s views on the administrative 
state—namely nondelegation—remain relatively unknown.200  This is 
partly due to Justice Kavanaugh’s serving on the D.C. Circuit before his 
nomination, the court which most contributes to administrative law;201 in 
contrast, Justice Barrett served on the Seventh Circuit before her 
nomination.  Nevertheless, she is an originalist like the late-Justice Scalia, a 
mentor for whom she clerked, and was a member of the Federalist Society, 
an organization that emphasizes the importance of the nondelegation 
principle.202 
Although Justice Barrett’s opinions are limited, she has acknowledged 
exceptions to the nondelegation doctrine exist.203  She has also stated “the 
notoriously lax ‘intelligible principle’ test reflects the Court’s conclusion that 
the decision of how to carry out routine social and economic policy belongs 
almost entirely to Congress.”204  This indicates Justice Barrett may be 
willing to revisit the nondelegation doctrine in limited settings, but may not 
partake in a total revision like Justice Gorsuch advocates for his in Gundy 
dissent.  Regardless, Justice Barrett’s approach to the administrative state 
and nondelegation is somewhat inconsequential as she will only add to a 
majority if she shares her colleagues’ views on the matter.   
The Court seemingly has the power to change the nondelegation doctrine 
to a more formalized approach with at least a five-member majority.  The 
position of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Thomas are 
known because of the dissent in Gundy.  Justice Kavanaugh is likely to 
support the same effort.  Furthermore, Justice Alito made it clear in his 
Gundy concurrence that he is open to reevaluating nondelegation.  The 
 
dissenting) (explaining the president does not have free standing authority to write rules and only may 
act pursuant to grants of authority from Congress); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 
537 F.3d 667, 688 (2008) (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting) (discussing the importance of separation of powers 
that the founders so cautiously established). 
200. Shannon Osaka, Amy Coney Barrett’s Confirmation Could Revive This Hidden Doctrine— 
and Derail Climate Action, GRIST (Oct. 26, 2020), https://grist.org/politics/this-hidden-doctrine-could-
stymie-climate-action-under-the-new-supreme-court-with-amy-coney-barrett/ [https://perma.cc/3F 
JG-V297] [hereinafter Osaka, Derail Climate Action].  
201. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Special Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 779, 781 (2002).  
202. Osaka, Derail Climate Action, supra note 200. 
203. See Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 317 (2014) 
(“[T]he Suspension Clause stands as an exception to the nondelegation doctrine, which emphasizes the 
extremely broad leeway that Congress enjoys in assigning responsibilities to the Executive Branch.”).  
204. Id. at 318. 
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Court likely has a majority supporting a more formal approach to 
nondelegation, with the ability to tailor administrative law the next time the 
issue is before the Court.   
With some Justices hopeful for another nondelegation challenge, the 
nondelegation doctrine may soon find itself reinvigorated to its former 1935 
glory.205  With former Vice President Joseph Biden’s election to the 
Presidency,206 President Trump will not fill any more Supreme Court seats.  
Although President Biden may prevent a reinvigorated nondelegation 
doctrine from coming to fruition.207  Yet, to get to the Court, a case must 
first start in the lower courts, another area where President Trump has made 
a significant impact. 
C. The Lower Federal Courts  
President Trump’s biggest impact on the federal judiciary is greatly felt in 
the lower courts as he inherited an unusually large number of federal judge 
vacancies.208  Continuing to work in lockstep with the Federalist Society, 
President Trump set records by filling roughly 25% of the federal judiciary 
with his nominees within his first two years in office.209  President Trump 
appointed more federal appellate judges than any other president in 
history—appointing forty-eight circuit court judges—in less than three 
years.210  
 
205. Yoo & Phillips, supra note 8. 
206. Scott Detrow & Asma Khalid, Biden Wins Presidency, According to AP, Edging Trump in 
Turbulent Race, NPR (Nov. 7, 2020, 11:26 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/07/928803493/biden-
wins-presidency-according-to-ap-edging-trump-in-turbulent-race [https://perma.cc/B929-Y94B]. 
207. There is much speculation to whether President Biden will attempt to undo the 
conservative stronghold on the federal judiciary secured under former-President Trump.  Many 
speculate that President Biden, along with the help of Congress, may attempt to stack the Supreme 
Court to obtain a liberal majority or strip the federal courts of jurisdiction on particular issues.  
Christopher K. Sprigman, A Constitutional Weapon for Biden to Vanquish Trump’s Army of Judges,  
THE SOAPBOX (Aug. 20, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/158992/biden-trump-supreme-
court-2020-jurisdiction-stripping [https://perma.cc/89QY-FRPE].  This would certainly be an 
unprecedented change to the modern federal judiciary that may rob the judicial branch of its apolitical 
and co-equal status.  Such a dramatic change in an attempt to liberalize the federal judiciary may leave 
the nondelegation doctrine in exile for another eighty-five years. 
208. Hawkins, supra note 176, at 29. 
209. Id. 
210. Id.; see also Millhiser, supra note 178 (“At [a similar point] point in the Obama presidency, 
Obama had appointed only 24 court of appeals judges, meaning that Trump is appointing appellate 
judges twice as fast as Obama.  At a similar point in their presidencies, President George W. Bush had 
filled only 30 seats on the federal appellate bench; President Clinton, 27; President George H.W. Bush, 
31; and President Reagan, 23.”). 
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The record-setting amount in this short period is significant as one in 
every four federal circuit court of appeals judge is now a Trump 
appointee,211 leading to “flipping” multiple circuit courts with Republican-
appointed majorities.212  President Trump has made quick use of his 
appointment powers to change the circuit courts’ judicial philosophy.  This 
is significant because, as Justice Sotomayor once quipped, “the [circuit] 
court of appeals is where policy is made.”213  While courts do not “make” 
policy, they certainly shape the law as many laws are broad and unclear.  As 
the judicial philosophy of the circuit courts becomes more conservative with 
President Trump’s appointments, their philosophy will be reflected in the 
law’s interpretation.  
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Gundy is a welcome invitation to challenge 
broader statutes as unconstitutional delegations of power to restore the 
proper separation of powers articulated in Justice Gorsuch’s dissent.214  
Emboldened by Gundy, such challenges are likely to soon end up in a circuit 
court of appeals.  While the Supreme Court is the court of last resort for a 
select few, a circuit court of appeals is where many cases end.  In 2018, the 
Supreme Court heard only seventy-six cases, while the twelve circuit courts 
of appeals had 49,363 filings in total.215  This means for thousands of cases 
a year, the judges on the circuit court are the final arbiters of an issue.  As 
the court’s dynamics change with the addition of judges possessing 
conservative judicial philosophy, circuit courts will likely come to different 
conclusions on the same issue—like nondelegation.   
Conservative judicial philosophy favors a strict construction of the 
Constitution, adhering to the framers’ original intent.216  As such, since the 
 
211. Colby Itkowitz, 1 in Every 4 Circuit Court Judges Is Now a Trump Appointee, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 21, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/one-in-every-four-circuit-co 
urt-judges-is-now-a-trump-appointee/2019/12/21/d6fa1e98-2336-11ea-bed5-880264cc91a9_story.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/2UR8-KVNQ]. 
212. See Tim Ryan, Trump Flips Another Circuit to Majority of GOP Appointees, COURTHOUSE NEWS 
SERV. (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/trump-flips-another-circuit-to-majority-
gop-appointees/ [https://perma.cc/58JF-DJ2C] (stating the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuit 
Courts of appeals now have a majority of Republican appointed judges after President Trump’s 
nominees were confirmed).  
213. Millhiser, supra note 178. 
214. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority 
of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would 
support that effort.”). 
215. Itkowitz, supra note 211. 
216. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservatism v. A Principled Judicial Activism, 10 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 275 (1987).  
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Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, conservative judges 
strictly construe this provision, limiting the scope of the legislature’s ability 
to delegate.  Judges with a stronger conservative judicial approach, like the 
ones appointed by President Trump, are likely to share views like 
Justice Gorsuch and favor a more formalized approach to nondelegation.  
The Supreme Court often takes cases to resolve circuit court splits—the 
circumstance when two or more circuit courts arrive at a different 
conclusion on the same issue.217  If the same statute was challenged as an 
unconstitutional delegation of power in separate circuit courts and the 
courts differed on their application of the nondelegation doctrine, we may 
see another nondelegation case before the Supreme Court in the next few 
years.  With President Trump’s influence on how the lower courts will 
interpret the law, it is likely the difference in interoperative approaches to 
nondelegation are growing and will lead to circuit splits.  
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh 
seem ready to address another nondelegation issue and tailor the law’s 
approach to strengthen the constitutional command of separation of 
powers.  
However, suppose the nondelegation doctrine was strengthened, 
requiring statutes to contain a more formalized delegation of power, as 
Justice Gorsuch suggests.  Thus, forcing Congress, not an executive agency, 
to make fundamental policy judgments.  In that case, it is likely to create 
tension with the current Administrative Procedure Act.  
V.    THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND NONDELEGATION  
The current expansive and ever-growing administrative state is founded 
on two documents—the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure 
Act.218  Regulations promulgated by government agencies created within 
the discretion delegated to them by Congress play an everyday role in 
American lives.219  Strikingly, by the end of 2016, the Code of Federal 
Regulations contained tens of thousands of rules totaling more than 175,000 
 
217. Circuit Split, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/circuit_split 
[https://perma.cc/XNQ7-VML5]. 
218. Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion, supra note 5, at 166. 
219. See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121, 
122 (2016) (mentioning everyday situations in which Americans may encounter regulation promulgated 
by a federal agency). 
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pages.220  In 2016 alone, with power delegated to them by Congress, federal 
administrative agencies filled over 95,000 pages of the Federal Register with 
proposed rules, notices, and over 3,800 final rules promulgated by 
agencies—an increase from the 3,410 final rules promulgated in 2015.221  
In contrast, during that same two year period, Congress only passed 329 
public laws taking up a modest, by comparison, 3,036 pages in the Statutes at 
Large.222  This illustrates the enormous amount of delegation from 
Congress to federal agencies.  The People’s representatives give unelected 
bureaucrats the power to promulgate thousands of rules with the force of 
law to dictate Americans’ daily lives. 
“Congress is the constitutional body of the administrative state.”223  As 
Justice Gorsuch recognized in his dissent, Congress often delegates to avoid 
political responsibility for unpopular decisions.  Delegation through broad 
statutes allows legislators to avoid confronting “hard political decisions 
which underlie legislative precision.”224  This avoidance corrupts a 
fundamental principle of nondelegation—accountability.225  As delegation 
increases, political accountability decreases.226  Such corruption of 
fundamental principles has left some to declare that administrative 
regulations are unlawful.227 
Even if delegation is appropriate, and it seems like it almost always is at 
the federal level, Congress then imposes additional requirements an agency 
 
220. Christopher J. Walker, Restoring Congress’s Role in the Modern Administrative State, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2018) (citing CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST.,  
TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY 
STATE 19–20 (2017)), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Ten%20Thousand%C20Commandments% 
202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TDC-3JPR]). 
221. Id.   
222. Id. at 1102. 
223. Robert C. Sarvis, Legislative Delegation and Two Conceptions of the Legislative Power, 4 PIERCE L. 
REV. 317, 346 (2006).  
224. George Bunn et al., No Regulation Without Representation: Would Judicial Enforcement of a Stricter 
Nondelegation Doctrine Limit Administrative Lawmaking?, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 341, 371 (1983) (quoting 
Nelson Rosenbaum, Statutory Structure and Policy Implementation: The Case of Wetlands Legislation, 8 POL’Y 
STUDIES J. 575, 576 (1980)).  
225. There are three fundamental principle of nondelegation: “democratic accountability for 
legislators and the President, inter-branch accountability for executive and administrative action, and 
limitation on government power through checks-and-balances.”  Martin Edwards, Who’s Exercising 
What Power: Toward a Judicially-Manageable Nondelegation Doctrine, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 65 (2016).  
226. Id. 
227. PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 493 (2014). 
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must fulfill before it can promulgate a rule.228  Congress has created the 
monstrous administrative state and subsequently works to keep it from 
going rogue.  As a side effect of Congress’s delegations, it imposes on itself 
the responsibility to create additional requirements to establish safeguards 
and ensure agencies stay within their allotted discretion.  To do so, Congress 
passed the Administrative Procedure Act to establish limitations and create 
consistencies for federal agency actions.229 
A. The Administrative Procedure Act  
Rulemaking is a federal agency’s ability to “specify, clarify, and refine 
Congress’s work-product—in short, to finish the task of legislating.”230  
The APA is designed to establish procedural limits to cabin threats to 
individual liberty associated with the administrative state’s growth.231  For 
an Act regulating the 3,000-plus final rules promulgated last year, one can 
imagine how detailed and complicated the Act can be.   
The APA applies to all federal agencies in general and therefore does not 
contain specific provisions applicable to either executive or independent 
regulatory agencies.232  Under the APA, the distinction is in the procedure 
required by the different grants of legislative authority to make either an 
informal or formal rule.233  A “rule” made under the APA is defined 
broadly as  any “agency statement of general or particular applicability and 
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy” 
or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an 
agency.234 
Informal rulemaking requires three steps: (1) an agency must give notice 
to potentially interested parties by publishing proposed rules in the Federal 
 
228. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551–59 (1946) (placing requirements 
on federal agencies that must be fulfilled prior to implementing rules).   
229. Scott F. Johnson, Administrative Agencies: A Comparison of New Hampshire and Federal Agencies’ 
History, Structure and Rulemaking Requirements, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 435, 438 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Administrative Agencies].  
230. Cornelius M. Kerwin, Administrative Law and Regulation: Making Rules: An Introduction, 
Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1995) 
[hereinafter Kerwin, Administrative Law and Regulation].  
231. Dominique Custos, The Rulemaking Power of Independent Regulatory Agencies, 54 AM. J. COMP. 
L. (SUPP. ISSUE) 615, 623 (Fall 2006) [hereinafter Custos, The Rulemaking Power].  
232. For the purpose of this paper it is not consequential to distinguish between executive or 
independent agencies.  The conclusion of this paper would apply to either and, therefore, will make no 
distinction and will simply refer to a general “federal agency.”  Id. at 624.  
233. Id. (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1946)). 
234. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1946).  
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Register; (2) an agency must give interested parties the opportunity to respond 
to the proposed rule through written and oral means; and (3) after allowing 
time for comment and gathering additional information, the agency must 
publish a statement explaining the final form thirty days before the rule’s 
effective date.235  Informal rulemaking is generally satisfied by giving people 
a reasonable opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.236  The 
quasi-legislative nature of these requirements allows for public input on the 
promulgation of rules that will affect their everyday lives, but it does not 
mandate the agency adopt into the final rule the positions advanced by 
public comments.237 
Rules are typically promulgated under informal requirements, but 
occasionally formal rulemaking can be mandated under sections 556 and 
557.  Formal rulemaking only applies “when rules are required by statute to 
be made on record after an opportunity for agency hearing.”238  The formal 
rulemaking procedure is trial-like, as the agency must provide a party the 
opportunity to present evidence and conduct cross-examination in a hearing 
presided over by an agency official or administrative law judge.239  The need 
for the rule must be supported by substantial evidence on the record.240  
However, the Supreme Court interpreted formal rulemaking narrowly, 
holding it is only required when Congress mandates the rulemaking 
proceeding be “on the record.”241  Congress rarely imposes this rulemaking 
standard on agencies, so the formal rulemaking process is essentially 
nonexistent in administrative law.242  
Though formal procedures are rarely required, Congress occasionally 
imposes additional requirements in tandem with informal rulemaking.  
Hybrid rulemaking is the requirement of procedures above what is imposed 
by the informal rulemaking standards.243  Hybrid rulemaking lends itself to 
 
235. Id. at § 553(a)-(e).  
236. Custos, The Rulemaking Power, supra note 231, at 624; Johnson, supra note 229, at 446. 
237. Johnson, supra note 229, at 449. 
238. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556–57 (describing when formal rulemaking may be necessary). 
239. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 3 (2017).  
240. Comment, Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act Through Rulemaking:  
The Implications of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 
148, 155–56 (1977) [hereinafter Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act].   
241. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 3 (2017) (citing United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 251 (1973)).   
242. Id. 
243. Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act, supra note 240, at 150.   
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greater flexibility than formal rulemaking and provides for greater public 
participation than informal rulemaking.244  Some of the hybrid 
requirements placed on agencies before they can act include: developing 
information on the paperwork burden generated by the rules, reducing 
regulatory burden on small business, holding hearings, or conducting 
environmental impact statements.245  This is all necessary because Congress 
chooses to pass on bare-bones legislation to federal agencies to be 
implemented with their discretion.246  Federal agencies are bloated with 
discretion.  
B. Will a Revived Nondelegation Doctrine Reduce Agency Bloat? 
Federal regulations cost Americans roughly $1.9 trillion in 2016.247  This 
is an exuberant amount of money spent based on the recommendations of 
unelected officials.  Agency bloat is amplified by the requirements imposed 
on them by the APA to ensure these quasi-legislative bodies do not abuse 
their rulemaking power.  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
perhaps one of the most bloated federal agencies as it has expanded its scope 
over time to create some of the broadest delegations with no repercussion—
particularly with the Clean Air Act.248  
To illustrate hybrid rulemaking in action, from 2010 to 2017, federal 
agencies conducted a total of 1,161 environmental impact statements.249  
The average timeframe for each impact statement was four years and five 
months.250  This is just one example of the hundreds of hybrid rulemaking 
rules imposed on federal agencies under the APA, which consumes a lot of 
time and money.  If nondelegation were revived with a more formalized 
 
244. Id.   
245. Custos, The Rulemaking Power, supra note 231, at 628. 
246. See id. at 619 (“Moreover, the widespread of rulemaking does not necessar[ily] derive from 
a clear congressional intent.”); see also Cost and Burden of Federal Regulations Reach $1.9 Trillion, 
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (May 31, 2017), https://cei.org/content/costs-and-burden-federal-
regulations-reach-19-trillion [https://perma.cc/GHA4-UWX6] (reporting for every law enacted last 
year, eighteen rules were issued).   
247. Cost and Burden of Federal Regulations Reach $1.9 Trillion, supra note 246.   
248. The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act grant incredibly broad discretion regarding 
technology and admission standards.  William McGarth & Jeffery Jay, The Nondelegation and Enviro Regs, 
Post-Gundy, LAW360 (July 18, 2019, 2:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1179508/the-
nondelegation-doctrine-and-enviro-regs-post-gundy [https://perma.cc/8FM7-VNX9]. 
249. Press Release, Executive Office of the President Council on Environmental Quality, 
Environmental Impact Statements Timelines (Dec. 14, 2018) (on file with author). 
250. Id. 
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approach like Justice Gorsuch’s,251 a tension would likely be created with 
the APA because the need for all the rulemaking procedures would be 
reduced as delegation lessens.  
If the purpose of the APA is to give guidance in specifying and clarifying 
Congress’s work product, and if delegation lessened and Congress had to 
make the fundamental policy judgments, federal agencies can shift from 
spending so much time clarifying Congress’s mandates to actually 
implementing them.  That is not to say Congress must specify every detail, 
which might slow down the system even more.  However, if statutes 
contained more detail than stating to implement it in “the public interest,” 
it would likely make rulemaking more efficient and less costly.252  The less 
detail an agency has to fill in, the more efficient it will be in implementing a 
congressional act.253  Perhaps the number and length of environmental 
impact statements would not be necessary.  
The purpose of a rulemaking hearing is to allow interested persons to 
shape the law governing their everyday lives.254  Political accountability 
comes into play because the people have already spoken through the 
election of their congressional representatives who are the ones tasked with 
representing people’s interests in regulations.  If the people must again 
advocate on their own, then what exactly do congresspeople do?  With a 
stronger nondelegation doctrine, Congress will have to limit agency 
authority to just findings of fact to implement Congress’s policy judgments.  
By reducing delegation, there will be less need to monitor agencies to keep 
them from going rogue, as Congress would further detail the policy to be 
implemented.  Thus, the APA’s purpose would be diminished in part while 
still serving as a vital check on further congressional mandate.  
VI.    CONCLUSION 
The constitutionally mandated nondelegation doctrine is dead—at least 
for the time being.  Nondelegation is not about shrinking the size of the 
 
251. Recall the three questions Justice Gorsuch stated should be asked: “Does the statute assign 
to the executive only the responsibility to make factual findings?  Does it set forth the facts that the 
executive must consider and the criteria against which to measure them?  And . . . did Congress, and 
not the Executive Branch, make the policy judgements?”  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 
2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
252. Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act, supra note 240, at 178 (citing Env’t. Def. 
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, 348 F. Supp 916, 927 (N.D. Miss 1972), aff’d, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 
1974)). 
253. Id. at 150.   
254. Johnson, Administrative Agencies, supra note 229, at 449. 
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administrative state.  It is about enforcing the Constitution.  Our founders 
sought to protect individual liberty by granting all legislative power to 
Congress, but that has given way to political expediency.  The uncontested 
truth is all legislative power is vested in Congress; however, the struggle over 
the past eighty-four years centers on what is considered legislative.  Gundy is 
the most recent showing of this struggle.  Delegation is necessary to keep 
the government from getting bogged down in minutia, but Congress must 
first establish a complete policy framework for administrative agencies to 
fill in.  
In narrowly construing a challenged statute under nondelegation, the 
Court created a tradition of straining to read a statutory scheme to avoid a 
delegation issue.  This is what Justice Gorsuch seeks to change with his 
reasoning in Gundy.  Many see his dissent as the beginning of a 
transformation in administrative law.  President Trump’s judicial 
appointments have created a more conservative federal judiciary, which as a 
whole likely support stronger requirements for delegations from Congress.  
With a majority of Justices now on the Court who support reevaluating 
nondelegation, it is likely the intelligible principle may give way to a more 
formalized approach.  
Until then, the APA will continue to guide agency discretion as federal 
bureaucrats promulgate thousands of rules a year.  While the different types 
of rulemaking requirements seek to ensure agency discretion is cabined 
within appropriate limits, the limits are essentially limitless when statutes are 
vaguely worded.  However, if agency delegation is limited by a revived 
doctrine, the APA’s purpose would be diminished in part and rulemaking 
would be more efficient, as the full policy detail would have to come from 
Congress.  
The Court must call foul when necessary to restore the separation of 
powers, protect individual liberty, and keep delegation from running riot.  
Stand by and watch, over the next few years—administrative law in the 
United States is going to change. 
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